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Abstract 
Hacking of IP surveillance camera systems came to public attention in 2016 when the high bandwidth and resources 
were exploited for a massive DDoS attack that affected one third of all US Internet services. A review of previous 
studies show that a vast number of IP cameras have been hacked because the default usernames and passwords 
have not been changed from the factory defaults. In this research we asked, What are the vulnerabilities of an IP 
surveillance camera?  The purpose of the study was to provide identification of vulnerabilities and guidance for 
the protection of surveillance camera systems. The research shows that the tested surveillance camera had many 
vulnerabilities and that there is urgency for distributing alerts and best practice guidelines. 
Keywords: Hacking, CCTV vulnerability, Evaluation, Security 
INTRODUCTION 
Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) systems have proliferated in businesses and for private use. The surveillance 
systems are relatively inexpensive and provide multiple sensors that feed information back to a centralised 
processing station and monitoring screens. The application is for monitoring assets and human behaviour for risk 
management. The sensors provide different data types that include visual, audio, infrared, and other spectrum data. 
Monitoring may proceed by human observation, automation, archival mapping, or a combination of these. Many 
systems have software to assist human decision-making, and resource management systems to optimise the cost 
of surveillance against the benefits it may deliver. Research has shown that these CCTV surveillance systems have 
critical points of failure (Costin, 2016). In addition, Ozkan (2016) shows that over 100,000 wireless Internet 
Protocol (IP) cameras in the research sample had little or no information security protection. Others show that 
surveillance cameras from 79 vendors are vulnerable to Remote Code Execution (RCE) (Kirk, 2016; Costin, 2016). 
The security problem is increased by vendors are selling IP cameras using the “white labelling” business model 
with the same firmware developed by the same company across the product range and with unprotected RCE. The 
vulnerability allows an attacker to seize control of the camera for manipulation. Manipulation can have several 
features, such as, data seizure, mechanical manipulation, anti-forensic data planting, exploitation of the bandwidth 
resource, end-user deception, and zombie exploitation (McKee, et al., 2017). A significant weakness is that most 
IP cameras only log authenticated requests and have no traces on the camera of user activity or unique 
identification. Hence, an attacker can be anonymous while acquiring real-time video streams, archived footage; 
email, FTP, other credentials, and access to the system resource controls. The significant vulnerability grants an 
attacker invisibility and the ability to host malware; run arbitrary software such as botnets, proxies and scanners; 
and create backdoors for future access. Consequently, a CCTV system is generally available to unauthorised 
control, and the system itself, can sponsor attacks on other systems (Coole, et al., 2012; Cuputo, 2014; Costin, 
2016). In this paper, we test an out-of-the box camera to identify security vulnerabilities. 
BACKGROUND 
On 21 October 2016, a massive DDoS attack against Dyn, a domain name system (DNS) provider, broke a large 
portion of the Internet, causing a significant outage to hundreds of websites and services (CCTV, 2017). Although, 
Dyn did not disclose the actual size of the attack, but it has been speculated that the DDoS attack could be much 
bigger than the one that hit French Internet service and hosting provider OVH that peaked at 1.1 Terabytes per 
second (TBps), which is the largest DDoS attack known to date (Smith, 2013). The attack was caused by a botnet 
that consisted of 100,000 devices infected by malware named Mirai. The Mirai malware targeted Internet of Things 
(IoT) devices such as IP cameras and digital video recorders (DVR) that have weak default passwords, making 
them easy to infect (Wu, et al., 2010; Zanella, 2014; Kirk, 2016). A similar study by Minin (2015) found that a 
malicious attacker took control of the cameras remotely and controlled movement, redirected the video feeds, and 
worked out the password for the wireless network the device was connected. The owners of the surveillance camera 
systems were not aware of the system compromise and the use for a massive attack. A similar study analysed 
Motorola’s Focus 73 (Minin, 2015) outdoor security camera. Images and video taken by the camera can be 
delivered to a mobile phone application. One attack showed how it is possible to scan for cameras connected to 
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the Internet and then to get a reverse root shell to forge control credentials. Additionally, by tampering with DNS 
settings, the attacker can intercept the alerts that the camera sends to its owner, as well as to see video clips that 
would be sent to a cloud storage service. Further analysis showed that the firmware is a generic and used in other 
kinds of IP cameras. The code is not encrypted or digitally signed leaving open a backdoor for malware to be 
uploaded to the camera (Gotham Digital Science, 2012).  
The argument for protection when the surveillance system is on a dedicated network without access to other client 
systems, is shown to be false (Tekeoglu et al., 2015). The experiment was performed on MicroDigital, HIVISION, 
CTRing and a substantial number of other rebranded devices. The result shows the tested surveillance systems 
transmit the user name and password in clear text over port 5920 transmission control protocol (TCP) during 
authentication stage. The experiment also used a Metasploit framework to perform brute-force and dictionary 
attacks on the tested devices. The sample showed that 70% of the instances utilised had the default vendor 
passwords that had not been changed.  
The list of known CCTV vulnerabilities have been published in a database (CCTV Calculator, 2017). They list 
vulnerabilities existing in the vendors product range including Siemans, ZoneMinder, Zhuhai RaySharp, Samsung, 
Grandstream, WESPMonitor, WebGate, D-link, Panasonic, Cisco, Hikvision, FOSCAM, Y-Cam, TRENDnet, 
CIPCAMPTIWL, Dahua, TVT, AVTECH, Brickcom, TP-LINK, AirLive, Axis, Sony, QNAP, Arecont Vision, 
GeoVision, March Networks, Canon, FlexWATCH, Mobotix and Linksys. The vulnerability discovered in 
GeoVision DVR systems allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code by calling the GetAudioPlayingTime 
method with arguments. Tian (2014) shows more detailed vulnerabilities in GeoVision include directory traversal 
in geohttpserver and SanpShotToFile in GeoVision LiveX. Weak encryption schemes for passwords allows 
attackers to obtain the password via sniffing (Wu, et al., 2010). The sysinfo script in GeoHttpServer allows remote 
attackers to cause a DoS via a long password, and triggering a buffer overflow. When GeoHttpServer is configured 
to authenticate users, it allows attackers to bypass authentication and access unauthorised files via a URL that 
contains %0a%0a – code injection (Bruschi, et al., 2003; Bojinov, et al., 2009). These examples indicate the 
GeoHttpServer has several vulnerabilities that gives access for an attacker to perform unauthorised activities 
within the surveillance system. Nonetheless, these vulnerabilities were discovered in the period between 2004 and 
2011 and no information is provided regarding whether or not these vulnerabilities have been fixed by the 
manufacturers since. Further research (Gotham Digital Science, 2012; Kyaw, et al., 2016) shows a remote file 
disclosure vulnerability in GeoHttpServer. The code has no authentication requirement and hence an attacker can 
exploit this vulnerability to retrieve and download stored files on the server such as ‘boot.ini’ and ‘win.ini’. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The aim of this research was to answer the research question: What are the vulnerabilities of an IP surveillance 
camera? To answer the question, the research has six phases (Figure 1). These phases include literature review, 
system setup, pilot testing, data collection, data analysis and its comparison with results of previous research. 
Different research phases employ different research methods. The literature review section, for example, provided 
understanding for the work of different authors and their recommendations for future research. This phase 
constitutes the qualitative part of the study. The data collection, on the other hand, included a pilot study and 
experiment conducted by testing the camera by trying different exploits. The system setup phase set up the 
equipment for the field trials. These rational phases constitute the quantitative part of the study. The final phase 
compares the results obtained from both parts of the study in a mixed methods approach (Bryman, 2012).  
 
 
Figure 1. Research Phases 
Literature
System Set 
Up
Pilot Test
Data 
Collection
Data Analysis
Comparative 
Analysis
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System Design  
The following devices are used in the research, and the system design is in Figure 2: 
 Target IP surveillance camera (10.0.0.2): GeoVision GV-FD220D 2MP H.264 IR fixed IP Dome camera 
 Network switch: Thomson TG585 v8 ADSL2+ wireless gateway 
 Client (10.0.0.5):  Lenovo laptop Thinkpad X200 Table with Intel Core 2 Duo CPU L9600 2.13GHz ×2, 
242.9 GB HDD and Windows 7 32-bit 
 Attack device 1(10.0.0.6): Lenovo laptop Thinkpad X200 Table with Intel Core 2 Duo CPU L9600 
2.13GHz ×2, 242.9 GB HDD and Kali Linux Rolling 2016.2 32-bit 
 Attack device 2 (10.0.0.3): Acer laptop Aspire V3-371-501P with Intel Core i5-4210U 1.7GHz, 4GB 
DDR3, 500 GB HDD and Windows 8.1 64-bit 
 
Figure 2. System Design 
Pilot Test  
After setting up the IP surveillance system network, a pilot run was made to configure and test the camera 
functionalities as well as network connections amongst all the devices. The user can connect to the IP camera 
either through Windows Explorer by entering its IP address in the URL field; or use GeoVision DMMultiView 
client software to connect the camera’s DVR by selecting the host IP address and type of device. A User can use 
GvIP Device Utility to find the IP camera IP address. GV IP Device Utility is an application software to help the 
user to manage IP cameras, update their firmware, identify them by their IP addresses within a local area network 
(LAN) or backup and restore their settings (Figure 3).  
 
 
Figure 3. GeoVision DMMultiview User Authentication and GeoVision DMMultiview Live Capture 
 
The attacking device ran Kali Linux, so we also needed to test whether it can connect to the IP camera in the 
pilot study, and to ensure a penetration test is possible using preinstalled tools from the attacking device.  
Data Management  
The tools Angry IP Scanner, WireShark, ophcrack, Burpsuite and Cain & Abel, were tested in the pilot study for 
performance and functionality. Each has their own built-in data processing ability as specified by the distinct 
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features and functions of the tool. Others tested, such as Nmap Hydra, Nikto and Metasploit, are command-line 
based and are relevant for data collection from IP cameras. The collected data are automatically processed and 
analysed by these tools. The results can be saved to a file; analysis performed, and a report generated. Data 
collection was undertaken with website and IP camera DVR penetration testing tools and techniques. For result 
accuracy, the same tools are used 3 times and then the collected data compared to identify any variations. Data 
dump files are created for each penetration tool used, and the collected data analysed. 
RESEARCH FINDINGS 
Angry IP Scanner and Nmap were used to collect information about the target system, such as its IP address, media 
access control address (MAC), manufacturer and server information. The Angry IP Scanner is a fast lightweight 
cross-platform IP address and port scanner; used to scan IP addresses in any range. It includes information on any 
of the ports by simply pinging each IP address to check if it is alive, then optionally resolving its hostname, 
determining MAC addresses and the vendor (Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4. Angry IP Scanner Network Scanning Result   
The result shows that our target IP surveillance system’s IP and MAC address, its manufacturer information as 
well as its active ports. Once, we obtain the target IP address, we used Nmap for further reconnaissance. Nmap is 
a free and open source utility for network discovery and security auditing. It uses raw IP packets to determine 
available hosts on the network, services offered, operating system (OS) they are running, type of pocket filters 
and firewalls in use as well as other user characteristics.  From the Nmap scanning results, the target IP camera 
has TCP port 80, 111 and 10000 open. Hence, it is shown again that a user can login to the target IP surveillance 
system through Windows Explorer via port 80, and port 10000 is the virtual switch system (VSS) port for video 
streaming. Thus, to further the research IP packets were collected, and packet sniffing and spoofing performed to 
identify any vulnerabilities in the system. Packet sniffing and spoofing are methods that identify the weak points 
of network system, particularly on a layer 2 switched network. A LAN uses address resolution protocol (ARP) 
with holes enabling the attacker to sniff packets and lodge ARP spoofing attacks.  
WireShark was put into monitoring and capturing mode to authenticate to the target surveillance system website 
application, in order to capture the user name and password either in clear text or in hash values. The captured 
packets were then analysed and by following the TCP packet streams, other matters for further investigation were 
discovered. Firstly, we were able to find the user name and password; and the two MD5 hash values. There were 
also two groups of 50 bits assigned to two variables, namely gUserName and gPassword. Finally, we saved both 
MD5 hash values to be decrypted. Similarly, Cain & Abel was used to recover passwords by sniffing the network, 
cracking encrypted passwords using dictionary, brute-force and cryptanalysis attacks, recovering wireless network 
keys, revealing password boxes, uncovering cached passwords and analysing routing protocols. Cain & Abel sniffs 
the network for the target device, and then launches attacks. We used ARP poisoning to perform a man-in-the-
middle (MITM) attack. During a MITM attack, the attacking device secretly intercepts, replays and potentially 
alters the communication between two parties who believe they are directly communicating with each other – in 
this case the camera and its control. The ARP poisoning feature caught the username and password when a client 
computer authenticated with the target IP surveillance system. There were 9,652 packets transmitted between the 
target IP surveillance system and its client were captured. The two MD5 hash values captured when logging into 
the target IP surveillance system from Windows Explorer browser, were sent to a hash value cracker – ophcrack 
to decrypt the hash values. ophcrack is a free open source program that cracks hash values, and Windows log-in 
passwords by using Lan Manager hash (LM) through a rainbow table. After entering both captured MD5 hash 
values into Wireshark, it returned the results as “empty”. Thus, WireShark did not capture any packets related to 
the user name and password in either clear text or hash values. Thus, we required the alternative software for hash 
value cracking and to gain the user name and password for the target IP surveillance system. Two cracking 
techniques were used, namely: brute-force and dictionary.  
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To identify the range of vulnerabilities a IP camera may have we used many cracking tools including Hydra. It is 
also called THC-Hydra, and is a command-line-based network logon cracker that can use a dictionary attack to 
decrypt passwords from many protocols and applications. Before using Hydra to run a dictionary attack on the 
target IP surveillance system, we needed to generate a word list. Based on the previous research reviewed, we 
formed a dictionary of possible default passwords, including admin as a common user name. Previous studies 
show that GeoHttpServer have several vulnerabilities; and HTTP header contains much useful information. Thus, 
we used these clues to run Hydra with the http-head command (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. Hydra Http-Head Dictionary Attack Result 
The results showed, 17 tries on 22 possible passwords; and one pair valid user name and password found. To 
confirm the result, we used the identified user name and password to login on the target surveillance system 
through Windows Explorer. The result confirmed they were correct. Hydra with http-get command was run to 
compare the results.   
DVR is the heart of IP surveillance system network and has a weak default password. Therefore, we evaluated 
how well the target IP surveillance system can resist such an attack. Metasploit was chosen for the task of 
developing and executing exploit code against the remote target machine. The results showed the attacking 
computer was not able to establish connection with 10.0.0.2 on port 5920 - the port used by most IP surveillance 
systems. We also tried the ports 4550, 5550, 6550 and 10000, which are the system’s data port, audio port and 
VSS port. Metasploit did not provide the option for a user to specify which port to exploit so we tried other tools. 
Nikto was used to perform web server scanning on the target IP surveillance system. Nikto is an open source web 
server vulnerability scanner, which performs comprehensive tests against web items, including over 6700 
potentially dangerous files/programs, checks for outdated versions of over 1,250 servers, and version specific 
problems on over 270 servers. It also checks for server configuration items such as the presence of multiple index 
files, HTTP server options, and will attempt to identify installed web servers and software. The following 
vulnerabilities were identified: 
 The anti-clickjacking X-Frame-Options header is not present 
 GET The X-XSS-Protection header is not defined. This header can hint to the user agent to protect against 
some forms of XSS 
 GET The X-Content-Type-Options header is not set. This could allow the user agent to render the content 
of the site in a different fashion to the MIME type 
 OSVDB-2119: GET/shopexd.asp?catakigud=’42:VP-ASP Shopping Cart 5.0 contains multiple SQL 
injection vulnerabilities. CVE-2003-0560, BID-8159 
 OSVDB-3092: GET /htpasswd: This might be interesting... 
 OSVDB-3268: GET /tmp/: Directory indexing found. 
 OSVDB-3092: GET /tmp/: This might be interesting... 
 OSVDB-3268: GET /images/: Directory indexing found 
 OSVDB-3268:GET /images/?pattern=/etc/*&sort=name: Directory indexing found 
Another tool used was the Burp suite, which is a Java based software platform of tools for performing security 
testing of web application. The suite of products combines automated and manual testing techniques and consists 
of a number of different tools, such as a proxy server, web spider, scanner, intruder, repeater, sequencer, decoder, 
collaborator, extender, and to brute force a login page. After installing the attacking device with Burp, Internet 
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Explorer is then configured to work with Burp. It can operate as MITM between the web browser and the target 
IP surveillance system web server, and it intercepts the traffic exchanged between the browser and the server. 
Internet Explorer (IE) was used to connect to the server and enter the correct user name and password. The 
interception and capture of the POST request gave the username and password that is supplied to the server. This 
can occasionally be a GET request also. The result shows that both the username and password are MD5 hash 
values (Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6. Burp Network Packet Capture Result 
We then used Intruder and Sniper to perform dictionary attacks on the MD5 hash values captured. Instead of trying 
to decrypt the captured hash values, Intruder and Sniper allows the attacker to perform a dictionary attack precisely 
on the captured MD5 hash value fields. The dictionary attack is performed, and a valid user name and password 
will be shown. Based on the word list used for the attack, there are 27 words used, 54 requests tried and responses 
in total. Table 1 summarises the vulnerabilities identified in the research and the software used.  
Table 1 Summary of vulnerabilities 
Software Functionality Attack 
Pilot Study 
Windows Explorer   Get Camera IP address Vector 
GeoVision DMMultiView Connect the camera’s DVR Vector 
GvIP Device Utility Manages IP camera, firmware updates, IP addresses within 
a local area network (LAN), backup records and restore 
settings  
Vector 
Main Study 
Angry IP Scanner Collects IP address, media access control address (MAC), 
manufacturer and server information 
Reconnaissance 
WireShark Collects IP address, media access control address (MAC), 
manufacturer and server information; packet capture 
Reconnaissance 
ophcrack Hash value cracker Analysis 
Burpsuite Performs security testing of web applications Reconnaissance 
Cain & Abel Recovers passwords, cracks encrypted passwords using 
dictionary, brute-force and cryptanalysis attacks, recovers 
wireless network keys, passwords and routing protocols 
Analysis 
Nmap Collects IP address, media access control address (MAC), 
manufacturer and server information, and system 
characteristics 
Reconnaissance 
Hydra (THC-Hydra) A network logon cracker that can use a dictionary attack to 
decrypt passwords for many protocols and applications 
Analysis 
Nikto Web server scanning for the target IP surveillance system Reconnaissance  
Metasploit Develops and executes exploit code against a remote 
camera 
Active agency 
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CONCLUSION 
In this research, we tested an out of the box GeoVision GV-FD220D 2MP H.264 IR fixed IP Dome camera for 
security vulnerabilities. Although the code injection and directory traverse exploitation techniques were rebuffed, 
many other points of vulnerability were identified. The two points of entry to the camera system were openly 
accessible through Windows Explorer or the GeoVision DMMultiView client. The password to the system was 
easily cracked (the factory default) and the GvIP Device Utility entry gained to control the IP camera. A fuller 
exploration of the whole surveillance system demonstrated the scope of a number of tools and the ability to gain 
control of critical information. Countermeasures are required to protect the IP camera from hacking and 
exploitation of the communication resources. Strong advice is to change the access password from the default, and 
then to change the password regularly. Detection of surveillance activity is required on a moment-by-moment 
basis and layers of protection are required to satisfy an attacker but also to maintain system integrity. Similarly, 
critical information requires encryption, protection by tunnelling, and cryptographic complexity to confuse 
analysis. The defeat of active agency can come by change management controls, benchmark auditing on a moment-
by-moment basis, and the regular updating of IP Camera anti-virus software. Our research suggests that IP cameras 
are vulnerable to exploitation and we advocate for a greater urgency in distributing countermeasures.     
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